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JUDGE ALBERT TATE, JR. AND THE EMPLOYEE
PERSONAL INJURY ACTION: AN OVERVIEW
George W. Pugh, Jr.
During my one year tenure as a law clerk with Judge Albert Tate,
Jr.,' I was continually impressed with Judge Tate's concern and appreciation for the individual members of the labor populace and the
hardships resulting from their work-related injuries. This concern was
evidenced by a willingness to look at each case from the point of view
of the injured worker and a strong desire not to allow procedural
technicalities to prevent a just result. Moreover, as was the case with
all litigants before his court, Judge Tate believed that the judicial process
should proceed to resolution with all possible speed. Whether the results
were favorable or unfavorable, Judge Tate was of the firm opinion that
to the litigants, the matter before the court was of paramount importance. Accordingly, Judge Tate was constantly pushing himself and others
to resolve matters before him as quickly as possible and to thereby
return a measure of certainty to the litigants' lives.
In light of the noted concern of Judge Tate for laborers and their
employment-related injuries, this writer decided to examine Judge Tate's
impact on this area of Louisiana law. In doing so, it became apparent
that Judge Tate's concerns have been clearly exhibited in his decisions
and, particularly, in several noteworthy opinions authored by him on
this subject. These opinions have had a substantial impact on the shaping
of the Louisiana law of employment-related injuries and have gone far
toward improving the lot of the injured worker in Louisiana.
The Louisiana courts and legislature have long recognized a distinction between actions by an injured employee for recovery against
his employer or principal and those by an injured employee against a
third person. 2 This distinction resulted from numerous considerations,
including, on the one hand, the dependency of the employee and family
on his livelihood and, on the other, the benefits obtained by the employer
or principal from the employee's labor.' This distinction, more fully

Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 1982-1983.
2. La. R.S. 23:1021 (1985).
3. If the accident was of the unavoidable variety, the employee was obliged by
the prevailing system to shoulder his loss without redress. Yet it is safe to
conjecture that the great bulk of work accidents must be regarded as part of
the unavoidable loss of modern industrial operations, and it cannot be said that
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explained below, resulted in different treatment being given to the employee's claims against employer-tortfeasors and those against third person-tortfeasors. There were many instances, however, when the

characterization of a tortfeasor as an employer or as a third person
became blurred and presented problems for the courts. This article
addresses these problem areas and the manner in which they were
considered and resolved by the concerned judicial efforts of Judge Albert
Tate.
I.

THE BASIC EMPLOYEE PERSONAL INJURY ACTION AND THE
WORKER'S COMPENSATION SCHEME

Beginning in 1914 with Louisiana Act No. 20, the Louisiana legislature recognized the then modern trend in other states and adopted
a version of the workers' compensation statute.4 Since then, the statute
underwent substantive and procedural amendment almost every session
of the legislature' but remained largely unchanged until 1975 and 1976
when major revisions were enacted. 6 From its original promulgation until
today, however, the Louisiana compensation law has continuously evi-

any person in particular is "to blame" for them....
Who is to absorb the unavoidable cost of these accidents? It is futile to
dismiss this question with the observation that the victim must shoulder his own
accident costs. Seldom does the average worker have accumulated savings sufficient to tide him over anything more than the most trivial mishap. The loss
brought about by a serious accident or death must usually be absorbed by
relatives or friends who are in a poor position to bear the overload, or, as is
more likely, the cost must be borne by organized charity or the state. ...
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the sound economic principle that those
persons who enjoy the product of a business-whether it be in the form of
goods or services-should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that
are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product.
Certainly this has always been true with reference to the capital structures and
the machinery and equipment necessary to process and distribute all industrial
products. Expected wear and tear and breakage of every sort is anticipated by
the producer and this cost is considered when he fixes the price of his commodity
or service. This is done without any reference to whether or not the loss should
be regarded as the result of fault on the part of the management. If the cost
is a predictable incident of the operation, sound business judgment demands
that it be included as an element of the price. The same should be true of the
human wreckage that is involved in production. The expected cost of injury or
death to workers can be anticipated and provided for in advance through the
medium of insurance, and the premiums can be regarded as an item of production
cost in fixing the price of the commodity or service.
1 W. Malone & H. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice, § 31-32 at 3738 in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2nd ed. 1980) [hereinafter Workers' Compensation].
4. 1914 La. Acts 20.
5. See 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 36 at 50.
6. Id.
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denced an underlying policy that work-related injuries be compensated
by the employer in all cases, but that this compensation be substantially

lower7 than that which the employee might otherwise have recovered in
tort.

The rationale for this policy has evolved from a complicated balancing of the interests of the employer and employee. 8 On the one hand,
it is recognized that employees will occasionally become injured through
no fault of either themselves, their employers or third persons. 9 In such
cases, the employee, who is usually dependent on the employment for
his and his family's livelihood, will have no avenue of recourse from
any source and will have no means to support himself during the period

of disability in the absence of a compensation remedy.10 Moreover, even
when the injury is caused, in fact, by the negligence or fault of his
employer, a co-employee or a third person (thus potentially giving rise
to a cause of action for monetary recovery), his recovery can be delayed
indefinitely if he is required to prove fault in a protracted litigation

proceeding." The employer, on the other hand, has obtained substantial

7. In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with
fairness to all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable
and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic
in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness
of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. But these are also
desirable from the personal point of view of worker and employer. The great
need of the employee is for immediate cash to meet his emergency. If the
amount of his claim is likely to be disputed, the delays of the old system and
the inequities of compromise will be resurrected and one of the humane purposes
of compensation will be lost. Furthermore, if the worker is to be guaranteed
at least a minimum sum to care for medical expense and support for each and
every accident, it is perhaps not unfair that he should forego his former claim
to be fully remunerated for pain and suffering and those other intangible elements
that go into the makeup of a conventional damage suit. From the employer's
standpoint it is undesirable to establish a compensation rate so high that it will
invite malingering and even feigned injury. Also, from an economic point of
view it is obvious that there is more room for free play of competition between
producers, if fixed items, such as compensation premium charges, constitute
only a small part of the total cost of production.
13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 32 at 39-40.
8. Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee
represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in
order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society.
The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where
he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages
and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by
compensation. (footnote omitted).
13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 32 at 40.
9. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 31 at 37.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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economic benefit from its employees by reason of the labor performed
by them. Moreover, the employer has required that the employees devote
much of their available time and energy to the employment and has
often exposed them to risks which they would not otherwise have encountered as a result of this employment.' 2 If the employer is not placed
under any obligation to compensate an injured employee for a nonfault work-related injury, the employer will have obtained the full economic benefit of the employee's labor but will have incurred no corresponding responsibility for his injuries unless the employee is successful
in overcoming the heavy burden of proof (and also of time and money)
in establishing fault on the part of the employer. 3 Further, the employer's ability to delay payment to the injured employee gives the
employer considerable leverage in forcing the employee to agree to an
inadequate settlement. 14 As stated by one noted commentator:
The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed
the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability
depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger
of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his
agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim,
were torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the
one hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other.
The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured
employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of
the full value of his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were
exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer against
whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill,
while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured
employee or his dependents. The employee's judgment was nearly
always too little and too late."

12. Prior to the 1975 amendments, the act specified that an employee must have
been engaged in "hazardous" employment to be entitled to compensation. The jurisprudence under the act, however, interpreted this requirement broadly. The sole reason
for the imposition of this requirement, at any rate, had been an effort to avoid any
perceived constitutional difficulties with the act. Inasmuch as the act has withstood
constitutional attack, the requirement of hazardous employment has been largely ignored.
See Robbins v. Caraway-Rhodes Veterinary Hospital, 315 So. 2d 688 (La. 1975) (per
Justice Tate) (finding employment at a veterinary hospital to be hazardous employment
although not specifically so designated in the act). See also 13 Workers' Compensation,
supra note 3, § 91-92.
13. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 13 at 31.

14. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 31 at 37.
15. Id.
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The resulting statutory remedy for this problem provides the employee with definite benefits, calculated as a certain percentage of the
employee's wages, for any work-related disability-causing injury. 16 This
remedy accrues to the employee without any necessity of proving employer fault.' 7 The employer, on the one hand, while subjected to this
indisputable liability for these injuries, does not incur liability for the
much greater recovery which the employee might have obtained in tort."8
Thus, in this classic compromise, the employee gives up a potentially
greater recovery in exchange for timely and certain, although less substantial, monetary benefits for work-related injuries. The employer, on
the other hand, gives up the potential freedom from liability for nonfault injuries, but becomes unquestionably responsible for the payment
of compensation benefits.
Because this statutory remedy has always represented a balancing
of competing interests,' 9 the result has been viewed on the one hand
by employers as unfair and overly liberal in favor of injured employees,
and on the other hand, by employees as providing a comparatively
meager remedy for disabling injuries. Accordingly, it is not surprising
that employers and employees alike have occasionally sought to avoid
the sometimes harsh effects of the statute. Employees have sought to
obtain benefits greater than those afforded by the act, and employers
have sought to avoid responsibility for non-fault injuries. Some of these
attempts, on each side, have been successful, and it is in the treatment
of these attempts that Judge Albert Tate, Jr. distinguished himself as
a judge actively involved in providing relief to injured employees and
in balancing the competing interests, as required by statute, with a liberal
view toward providing these employees with the greatest possible benefits.
It has been stated that:
The importance of the compromise character of compensation
cannot be overemphasized. The statutes [of the different states]
vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance.
The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length
of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced greatly
by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise
unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted to restore what
it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that

16.
17.
18.
19.

La. R.S. 23:1221 (Supp. 1987).
13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 32 at 39.
14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 361 at 132.
13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 32 at 41.
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favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act drawn in
a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely,
an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by
20
the courts that employers can have little reason to complain.

There is little question that, from its inception, the Louisiana compensation act was viewed as quite conservative. 2' Although the legislature
amended the act in almost every subsequent legislative session, these
amendments did not change the fundamentally conservative nature of
the act until the major revisions of 1975 and 1976.22 This conservatism
was evidenced in such details as compensation being payable only to
employees engaged in "hazardous" occupations, in compensation being
payable for only scheduled periods of time rather than for the duration

of the disability, and in compensation being payable at rates far below
the national average. 23 This writer suggests that in light of this conservatism, the Louisiana courts, and notably Judge Tate, interpreted the
compensation act liberally in favor of maximum coverage. This writer
further suggests that this liberal interpretation, imposed by the courts,
may have had an effect in prompting the legislature to liberalize the

act.
In this regard, the oft-repeated maxim in connection with workers'
compensation cases is that the statute should be interpreted liberally in
favor of coverage. Judge Tate's recognition of this interpretive principle
is evident in every known majority decision authored by him while on
the Louisiana Supreme Court which involved the interpretation of the
compensation act. 24 Not only did he often repeat the referenced general

20. Id.
21. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 36 at 49-50.
22. Id.
23. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 37.
24. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 379 So. 2d 950 (La. 1979); Lytell v. Strickland
Transportation Co., Inc., 373 So. 2d 138 (La. 1979); West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc.,
371 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1979); Crump v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 367 So. 2d
300 (La. 1979); Cousins v. Lummus Co., 364 So. 2d 993 (La. 1978); Bolden v. Georgia
Casualty & Surety Co., 363 So. 2d 419 (La. 1978); Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354
So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978); Lucas v. Ins. Co. of North America, 342 So. 2d 591 (La. 1977);
Walker v. Gaines P. Wilson & Son, Inc., 340 So. 2d 985 (La. 1976); Lewis v. St. Charles
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 337 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1976); Verbois v. Howard, 322 So. 2d
110 (La. 1975); Robbins v. Caraway-Rhodes Veterinary Hosp., 315 So. 2d 688 (La. 1975);
Owens v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 307 So. 2d 313 (La. 1975); Woodard v. Southern
Casualty Ins. Co., 305 So. 2d 528 (La. 1974); Dufrene v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
298 So. 2d 724 (La. 1974); Bass v. Service Pipe Trucking Co., Inc., 289 So. 2d 78 (La.
1974); Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 284 So. 2d 545 (La. 1973); Bellard v. Tri-State
Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 453 (La. 1973); Williams v. Hudson East, 261 La. 959, 261 So. 2d
629 (1972); McDermott v. Funel, 258 La. 657, 247 So. 2d 567 (1971); Jordan v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 245 So. 2d 151 (1971).
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principle, but in every such decision, he interpreted the statute to provide

the maximum compensation benefit to the injured employee. For example, on numerous occasions, Judge Tate wrote for the court in
reversing lower appellate court awards of lesser coverage and in awarding,
instead, permanent and total disability benefits to injured employees. 25

This was true even where the employee's only limitation from continuing
at previous unskilled employment was an intolerance to certain cleaning
compounds, 26 or where a skilled laborer could continue to work at his
trade but could only do so if not exposed to heights, 27 could only do
29
so with pain 2 or could only do some but not all of his prior duties.
This liberality of interpretation was also seen in connection with Judge

Tate's holdings on other issues, as, for example, in finding "dependent"
concubines and illegitimate children entitled to compensation benefits, 3 °
in expanding the scope of hazardous employment (which was a prerequisite for compensation coverage prior to 1975)3 1 to include virtually all
employment which caused work-related injury a2 and in liberally inter-

preting the act to avoid the potentially harsh effects of prescription33
or unwise settlements.3 4 Even in dissent, Judge Tate invariably argued
for greater benefits than were afforded by the majority."
These decisions are strongly indicative of Judge Tate's sympathetic

treatment of employees' work-related injuries within the context of the
act. However, from time to time, innovative attorneys have presented
arguments directed toward the expansion of remedies beyond those avail-

25. West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc., 371 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1979); Crump v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 367 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979); Cousins v. Lummus Co., 364 So.
2d 993 (La. 1978); Lucas v. Ins. Co. of North America, 342 So. 2d 591 (La. 1977);
Walker v. Gaines P. Wilson & Son, Inc., 340 So. 2d 985 (La. 1976); Lewis v. St. Charles
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 337 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1976); Williams v. Hudson East, 261 La.
959, 261 So. 2d 629 (1972).
26. Lewis v. St. Charles Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 337 So. 2d 1137 (La. 1976).
27. Cousins v. Lummus Co, 364 So. 2d 993 (La. 1978).
28. Williams v. Hudson East, 261 La. 959, 261 So. 2d 626 (1972).
29. Lucas v. Ins. Co. of North America, 342 So. 2d 591 (La. 1977).
30. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978); McDermott v.
Funel, 258 La. 657, 247 So. 2d 567 (1971).
31. La. R.S. 23:1035 (1985). See also 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, §§
91-93.
32. Robbins v. Caraway-Rhodes Veterinary Hosp., 315 So. 2d 688 (La. 1975).
33. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 376 So. 2d 950 (La. 1979); Crump v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 367 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979); Bolden v. Georgia Casualty &
Surety Co., 363 So. 2d 419 (La. 1978).
34. Verbois v. Howard, 322 So. 2d 110 (La. 1975); Dufrene v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 298 So. 2d 724 (La. 1974); Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 284 So. 2d
545 (La. 1973).
35. Chivoletto v. Johns-Manville Product Corp., 327 So. 2d 413 (La. 1976); Lisonbee
v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Co., 278 So. 2d 5 (La. 1973).
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the act, or directed toward the limitation of
alone, thus precluding greater tort recovery.
these arguments provides considerable insight
concerns of this great jurist.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER ACTIONS

Prior to 1976, the compensation statute provided that:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his
dependent on account of a personal injury for which he is
entitled to compensation under this Chapter shall be exclusive
of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
36
representatives, dependents, or relations.
As is apparent from this language, the compensation act was the exclusive
remedy available to an employee against his employer when the employee
had been injured during the course and scope of his employment. By
contrast, the courts had always held that the employee still had available
a tort remedy against any third person.3 7 Thus, an individual who was
able to establish the fault of a non-employer tortfeasor that had contributed to his injury was able to recover against this tortfeasor for the
full extent of his injuries." Questions arose, however, in the characterization of a tortfeasor as a third person or as an employer. Innovative
claimants attempted to obtain greater benefits by arguing that their
fellow employees were persons separate and distinct from the partnership,
corporation or proprietorship by which they were employed and were,
therefore, third persons within the meaning of the act.3 9 Thus, they
argued, they were entitled to recovery in tort from these co-employees,
including their foremen, superintendents and even including high level
administrative personnel such as presidents and vice-presidents of their
respective companies. In Canter v. Koehring Co.,"o the Louisiana Supreme
Court, per Judge Tate, addressed this argument and held that an
injured employee would be permitted to recover in tort against these
supervisory co-employees. The test applied by the court in determining
this liability was whether the co-employee had been personally responsible
for the safety of the injured person (including another employee), had
not delegated this responsibility to a subordinate, and had breached its

36. La. R.S. 23:1032 (1985) (emphasis added).
37. 14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 362.
38. Id.
39. Adams v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1958); Cf. Maxey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 255 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971).
40. 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
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duty of due care owed to the injured person. As stated by the court,
the test was whether:
1. The principal or employer owes a duty of care to the third
person (which in this sense includes a co-employee), breach of
which has caused the damage for which recovery is sought.
2. This duty is delegated by the principal or employer to the
defendant.
3. The defendant officer, agent, or employee has breached this
duty through personal (as contrasted with technical or vicarious)
fault.
4. With regard to the personal (as contrasted with technical or
vicarious) fault, personal liability cannot be imposed upon the
officer, agent, or employee simply because of his general administrative responsibility for performance of some function of
the employment. He must have a personal duty towards the
injured plaintiff, breach of which specifically has caused the
plaintiff's damages. If the defendant's general responsibility has
been delegated with due care to some responsible subordinate
or subordinates, he is not himself personally at fault and liable
for the negligent performance of this responsibility unless he
personally knows or personally should know of its non-performance or mal-performance and has nevertheless failed to cure
4
the risk of harm. 1
As could be expected, the Canter decision generated a great deal
of commentary and litigation. 42 Employees who were already receiving
workers' compensation benefits were able under this decision to pursue
greater tort recovery from their supervisory co-employees. 43 While the
courts generally applied the executive officer doctrine narrowly, there
were numerous cases in which employees were successful in pursuing
this avenue of recovery."
While the reasoning behind the Canter decision is exemplary, the
application of the so-called "executive officer" doctrine has been adverse

41. Id. at 721 (footnote omitted).
42. Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Executive Officer Liability, 33 La. L. Rev.
325 (1973); Note, Who Is an Executive Officer for Liability Insurance Coverage?, 34 La.
L. Rev. 141 (1973); Note, Workmen's Compensation-Third Party Tort Actions Against
Executive Officers-Negligence, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 352 (1971); McKenzie, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1973-74 Term-Insurance, 35 La. L. Rev. 415, 419
(1975) (and cases cited therein).
43. 14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 364 at 152.
44. See, e.g., Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978) (per Justice Tate).'

1002

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

to the interests of the employers. 4 This is because the employers invariably carried liability insurance which covered the negligence liability
of the employers' executive officers.4 Moreover, as a practical matter,
the company was required to provide this type of insurance protection
in order to keep its high level employees retained and in order not to
unduly stifle their operational decisions. 4 Accordingly, while the purpose
of the Canter doctrine was to place responsibility for negligent conduct
on the shoulders of the actual tortfeasors, and thereby to encourage
due care and responsible conduct on the part of co-employees, the result
was that the statutorily immune employers were paying tort damages to
their injured employees through their insurance policies (with correspondingly high insurance premiums).4 8 This state of affairs operated to
defeat the delicate balance which the workers' compensation act had
sought to create. However, as has been previously suggested, the fundamentally conservative nature of the act may have prompted the court
to tip this balance more in favor of the employee.
Another noteworthy decision authored by Judge Tate in this area
is Cooley v. Slocum. 49 In Cooley, similarly, Judge Tate spoke for the
court in holding that an injured employee of a partnership could recover
damages in tort from the individually negligent partners. The basis for
this ruling, as in Canter, was that the partner was a distinct entity
separate from the partnership-employer, and accordingly, the exclusivity
provision of the statute relating to the employer did not apply to the
individual partners. 0
Effective October 1, 1976, the Louisiana legislature amended the
compensation act to eliminate the executive officer action." For causes
of action arising subsequent to this effective date, therefore, an injured
employee's recovery from his employer or his co-employees was limited

45. It has been noted that the executive officer suit
gives rise to a serious problem of practical importance. If officers in the upper
echelons of management find themselves exposed to the often disastrous prospect
of tort liability for the almost unlimited number of employee accidents that
could be in some way attributed to their negligent, they will be impelled in
practice to exact liability insurance from the corporate employer. The result
may be a denial to the employer of much of the practical advantage of the
exclusive remedy provision.
14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 364 at 156 (quoting from W. Malone, Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice § 366 (1st ed., Supp.)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 326 So. 2d 491 (La. 1976).
50. Id.
51. 1976 La. Acts 147.
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to workers' compensation benefits.52 However, upon a showing that the
employee's cause of action arose prior to this date, the employee is,
even today, still entitled to pursue a tort remedy against his co-employees. 53 Accordingly, at least in the context of causes of action arising
from occupational diseases such as silicosis and abestosis-in which the
injurious exposure to dangerous products caused harm prior to October
1, 1976, but the disease has manifested itself only after this dateemployers are still feeling the effect of the Canter v. Koehring Co.
54
decision in this state.
III.

STATUTORY EMPLOYER

Inasmuch as the primary goal of the workers' compensation act has
been to protect workers from the potentially catastrophic effect of onthe-job injuries, the act incorporated certain provisions designed to correct perceived problems of improper administration. One such perceived
problem related to employers retaining independent contractors to perform certain aspects of the employer's work and thereby attempting to
avoid workers' compensation liability. 5 By interposing an independent
contractor as intermediary, the employer would argue that, inasmuch
as the compensation act applied only to the employer-employee relationship, an injured worker was not its employee but was actually an
employee of the independent contractor alone. Accordingly, the employer
would argue that the independent contractor was exclusively liable for
56
these benefits.
So long as the independent contractor was solvent or had obtained
compensation insurance, this would present no serious problem. However, if the independent contractor were impecunious or had not obtained
such insurance, the injured worker would be left without a remedy
because, absent statutory authority, he would not be able to proceed
past the independent contractor and obtain compensation from the true
principal. To resolve this apparent inequity, the legislature enacted La.
R.S. 23:1061. This statute provides:
Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade,
business, or occupation or which he had contracted to perform,

52. Green v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978); Billedeaux v. Adams, 355 So. 2d 1345 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 360 So. 2d 637.
53. See, e.g., Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976 (5th
Cir. 1985), rehearing denied, 758 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1985), and cases cited therein.
54. Id.
55. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 121 at 230-31.
56.

14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 121.
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and contracts with any person (in this section referred to as
contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the
whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the
principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in
the execution of the work or to his dependent, any compensation
under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if
the employee had been immediately employed by him .... 17
As is apparent, the effect of this statute is to permit an injured employee
of an independent contractor to obtain workers' compensation benefits,
not only from his immediate employer, but also from his principal, so
long as he was engaged in work that was "a part" of the principal's
58
"trade, business, or occupation" at the time of his injury.
Although the referenced statute was enacted specifically to address
the potential inequity resulting from employers hiring impecunious contractors, and was therefore intended to broaden the scope of recovery
available to laborers, the statute has in fact been applied to limit this
recovery.5 9 This is because the exclusivity provision of the workers'
compensation act, as it applies to an employee's recovery from his direct
employer, has also been held to apply to an employee's recovery from
his principal. 60 Thus, the statutory employer who has negligently caused
the injury of an independent contractor's employee is able to entirely
6
escape tort liability by interposing the statutory employer defense. 1
Moreover, this employer is able to avoid even compensation liability
because this employer is ultimately entitled to indemnification from the
injured employee's direct employer who remains primarily liable for
these benefits. 62 In this way, an employer who has negligently caused
the injury of an independent contractor's employee often incurs no
liability whatsoever for its negligent conduct. 63 For this reason, it is easy
to understand why the bulk of the jurisprudence interpreting La. R.S.
23:1061 has arisen in the context of an employee of an independent
contractor seeking to obtain tort recovery from the principal, and the
principal pleading the statute as a defense. 64

57. La. R.S. 23:1061 (1985).
58. 14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 126 at 250.
59. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 126 at 254, § 128 at 263-64.
60. Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950).
61. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 128 at 263-64.
62. La.. R.S. 23:1062 (1985). See also 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, §
129.
63. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 128 at 264.
64. 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 126;' 14 Workers' Compensation,
supra note 3, § 364 at 146. It is also interesting to note, in this context, that the burden
of proof shifts between the employer and employee depending on whether the employer
is seeking to avoid compensation liability or whether the employee is seeking to obtain
tort recovery. See 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 126 at 259.
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The supreme court again addressed this issue in 1972, at which time
Judge Tate was a member of the court. In Broussard v. Heebe's Bakery,
Inc.,61 the court addressed the issue whether a lower court should have
granted summary judgment in favor of an employer finding statutory
employer status. In addressing this issue, the court first held that summary judgment had not been appropriate and held, moreover, that the
employer was not, in fact, a statutory employer. The court went on to
state, however, in pure dicta, that if statutory employer status had been
granted, the compensation remedy would have been the exclusive remedy
available to the injured employee.
Judge Tate filed a concurring opinion in Broussard in which he
pointed out that much of the majority's verbiage had been dicta and
that, accordingly, the case was an inappropriate vehicle for the court's
resolution of this issue. Judge Tate went on to state:
La. R.S. 23:1061 was not intended to prevent injured employees
of a contractor from recovering in tort against a negligent principal. The intent of this statutory provision was simply to afford
an injured employee an alternative remedy in compensation against
a principal, who is entitled to indemnification from the true
employer of the injured workman. When in fact the true employer is responsible in compensation and is solvent and insured,
then the principal has no compensation liability and he is not
entitled to rely upon the compensation act (designed to protect
the employee, not a third person tortfeasor) as exempting him
from liability under the exclusive-remedy provision of the compensation act....
An erroneous prior judge-made interpretation of legislation is
always subject to judicial correction. Since judges made the
mistake, they can correct it. The traditional duty of the judge
in a civil-law jurisdiction such as Louisiana is to be bound by
the legislative intent and the legislation itself, not by any erroneous precedent enunciated by the former or present judges
66
of the court.

Later courts and commentators have cited this concurring opinion in
pointing out the problems which exist in the application of the statute
and have further pointed out that Louisiana is the only state which has
granted the advantage of exclusivity to the statutory employer.67

65. 268 So. 2d 656 (1972).
66. Broussard, 268 at 661.
67. Klohn v. Louisiana Power & Light, 438 So. 2d 563 (La. 1983); Roelofs v. United
States, 501 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1974), writ denied, 423 U.S. 830, 96 S. Ct. 49 (1975). See
also Burse v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., 351 So. 2d 172 (La. 1977) (Justice Tate
concurring in the denial of writs). See also 14 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, §
364 at 150.
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Although the Broussard opinion was hopefully viewed by some as
a possible harbinger of change, 68 the Louisiana legislature in 1976 adopted
the majority's interpretation of the statute and specifically amended
6 9
section 1032 of the compensation act to solidify this interpretation.
The legislature thus foreclosed any further judicial reconsideration of
the concerns raised by Judge Tate in Broussard, and the imbalance in
the act remains. Judge Tate's concurring opinion in Broussard, however,
is a clear example of his thoughtful and considered commitment to the
welfare of the common laborer in today's society and the delicate balance
sought to be achieved by the compensation act.
IV.

COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Another area in which Judge Tate has had an impact on the law
of Louisiana as it relates to employer liability is in the context of
defining and identifying the parameters of the phrase, "course and scope
of employment." It is axiomatic that an employer will be held liable
in damages for the torts of its agents or employees if these torts were
committed during the course of the employee's employment. 70 However,
it has not always been easy to define the boundaries of this concept,
particularly where the employee was engaged in a pursuit which was
7
wholly or partially motivated by personal concerns of the employee. 1
There can be no dispute that Judge Tate has been instrumental in
expanding this concept for the benefit of those who have been injured
by the negligence of such employees.
In LeBrane v. Lewis, 72 a supervisory employee terminated the employment of a subordinate. As the former was escorting the latter off
of the employer's premises, a heated altercation arose in which each
participant invited the other to engage in physical combat. Thereafter,
while still on the employer's premises, the supervisory employee stabbed
the discharged employee with a knife, causing injury. In subsequent tort
litigation against the employer, the question arose whether the employer
could be held responsible for the tort of the supervisory employee or
whether that employee had been outside the course of his employment.
In holding that the employee had been in the course of his employment
and that, accordingly, the employer could be held liable, Judge Tate
wrote for the court:
The dispute which erupted into violence was primarily employment-rooted. The fight was reasonably incidental to the

68.

See also 13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, § 128 at 264.

69.
70.
71.
72.

1976 La. Acts 147.
La. Civ. Code arts. 2317 and 2320.
13 Workers' Compensation, supra note 3, §§ 161-75.
292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974).
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performance of the supervisor's duties in connection with firing
the recalcitrant employee and causing him to leave the place of
employment. It occurred on the employment premises and during
the hours of employment.
In short, the tortious conduct of the supervisor was so closely
connected in time, place, and causation to his employment-duties
as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the
employer's business, as compared with conduct motivated by
purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer's interests. It can thus be regarded as within the scope
of the supervisor's employment, so that his employer is liable
7
in tort to third persons injured thereby. 1
The LeBrane decision has generated substantial legal discussion, and
is generally viewed as the leading case on the concept of "course and
scope of employment." Under the LeBrane rationale, so long as the
tortfeasor-employee is at a location required by his employer, and is
engaged in activities which are reasonably incidental to that employment,
then the employer will be found liable for his tortious acts even if these
acts were personally motivated. This decision, like the other decisions
referred to in this article, may be justified by the rationale that the
employer has chosen this employee, has required that the employee be
in the place and at the time specified, and the employer is obtaining
economic benefit from the employee's activities. It is reasonable to place
upon the employer the risk that the employee will cause injury, not
only while the employee is performing his regular duties, but also when
the employee has momentarily deviated from these duties for personal
reasons. Such a deviation is certainly foreseeable by the employer, and
when the deviation is reasonably incidental to the employment duties,
the employer should bear the loss. This is particularly true because the
employer is better able from an economic standpoint to bear this loss
and to pass this loss on to others. In the LeBrane case, it was not
unreasonable or unforeseeable that an altercation would arise upon the
firing of an insubordinate employee. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the court to place some of this "risk of harm fairly attributable
to the employer's business" upon the shoulders of the employer.
V.

CONCLUSION

The worker's compensation scheme represents a complex balancing
of the interests of employers and employees in today's society. However,
it cannot be disputed that this balance results in a lesser recovery to
employees when their work-related injuries are caused by the negligence

73.

LeBrane, 292 So. 2d at 218 (footnote omitted).
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of their employers. Prior to the 1975 and 1976 amendments, the act
was a conservative instrument which provided recovery to injured employees at a rate far lower than the national average. It is perhaps
because of this inherent inequity that whenever gaps were perceived in
the administration of the act, through which injured employees could
receive greater recovery, Judge Tate and the Louisiana Supreme Court
opened these gaps so as to permit such recovery. One particular example
of such a gap was the executive officer action recognized in Canter v.
Koehring Co.,7 4 in which injured employees obtained tort recovery against
their supervisory co-employees. The statutory employer issue was another
example. Although the court resolved this issue in favor of limiting the
recovery of injured employees, Judge Tate's concurring opinion in Broussard v. Heebe's Bakery, Inc.7" makes clear that Judge Tate would have
decided this issue differently. On the basis of Judge Tate's resolution
of these issues, one may hypothesize that although he approved of the
compensation remedy, he would have preferred the act to have been
more liberally drafted so that the recovery granted to injured employees
would have been more in favor of the employee. This result may be
justified in light of the economic benefit received by the employer as
a result of the activities of its employees. Further, this result would
encourage safer practices and due care on the part of the employer in
the conduct of its business.
It is perhaps partially a result of the court's liberal treatment of
the compensation act that the act was amended in 1975 and 1976 to
provide greater recovery to employees and to better comport with the
purposes for which the compensation act was enacted.
Finally, also in the context of employee-related injuries, Judge Tate
wrote for the supreme court in expanding the definition of "course and
scope of employment." LeBrane v. Lewis76 broadened this concept to
include even personally motivated activities so long as they were reasonably attendant to the employer's business.
Whatever opinion one might have with regard to Judge Tate's treatment of these issues, this writer suggests that this treatment exhibits
Judge Tate's commitment to an unflagging interest in the problems of
the common laborer injured while doing work that enriches his employer.
This concern and interest cannot be faulted for it shows a commitment
to the deeply rooted civilian concept that a person who has been injured
by the fault of another should be compensated therefore. While the
Louisiana legislature has, as of now, resolved these issues in a manner
more beneficial to the employer, it should never be said that Judge

74.
75.
76.

283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
263 La. 561, 268 So. 2d 656 (1972).
292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974).
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Tate's resolution of these issues in a different fashion indicates he was
anything less than a fair and true jurist committed to a just resolution
and fair compensation to those members of our society who constitute
the laboring class. For this, Judge Tate should be greatly respected, and
for this he remains deserving of our gratitude and appreciation.

